The Special Relationship

According to Henry Ford, the founder of Ford Motor Company, history is bunk. I do not believe this to be true but if you replace ‘history’ with ‘the special relationship’, he would have a point. The phrase is an unofficial term describing the supposed close political, diplomatic, cultural, economic, military and historical ties between the United Kingdom and the United States.

The relationship at the birth of America was anything but special. Indeed, it took until World War II for the relationship to become close. The phrase was not used until Winston Churchill spoke about it in 1946. Since those days, many a British Prime Minister has claimed that he or she was standing shoulder to shoulder with the US President of the time. If that was true, every PM would have needed a soap box to stand on.

The post-World War II history of relations between US and UK does not demonstrate a consistent, unbroken alliance. There have been times when it could be best described as frosty, difficult and embarrassing. For example, PM Harold Macmillan patronized JFK when stating that it was Britain’s historical duty to guide the power of the United States as the ancient Greeks had the Romans. Kennedy was not impressed. Macmillan wanted to broaden the special relationship beyond Churchill’s concept into a more inclusive "Atlantic Community". JFK wanted none of it.

The relationship was tested severely by the Skybolt missile crisis of 1962, when JFK unilaterally cancelled a joint US/UK project. He did not inform the British beforehand. Tensions were exacerbated when Dean Acheson, a former Secretary of State, challenged publicly the existence of the special relationship as he marginalized the British contribution to the Western Alliance.

British PM Harold Wilson recast the alliance as a 'close relationship' but Wilson's attempt to mediate in Vietnam was not welcomed by President Lyndon Johnson. “I won't tell you how to run Malaysia and you don’t tell us how to run Vietnam,” LBJ supposedly told Wilson in 1965. When US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara asked Britain to send troops to Vietnam as 'the unwritten terms of the Special Relationship', Wilson refused to commit regular forces. Thereafter, the relationship between LBJ and Wilson was soured, if not torn apart.

PM Ted Heath preferred a ‘natural relationship’ and stressed that the special relationship was not part of his vocabulary. The Heath-Nixon era was dominated by the United Kingdom's 1973 entry into the  EEC. Although the two leaders' 1971 Bermuda communiqué restated that Britain’s entry to the EEC served the interests of the Atlantic Alliance, American observers voiced concern that the British government's membership would impair its role as an honest broker.

Indeed, Nixon sought to impede the EEC's inclusion in the relationship through an economic policy which dismantled the post-war international monetary system and sought to force open European markets for US exports. The personal relationship at the top of government became less than special. Heath, it has been alleged, hardly dared make a phone call to Richard Nixon for fear of offending his new Common Market partners.

The personal friendship between President Reagan and PM Thatcher rekindled the relationship. Apart from liking each other, they shared a commitment to the philosophy of the free market, low taxes, limited government and a strong defence. They both rejected détente and were determined to win the Cold War. Thatcher summed up her understanding of the special relationship at her first meeting with Reagan in 1981: "Your problems will be our problems and when you look for friends we shall be there."

In 1982, Thatcher and Reagan reached an agreement to replace the British Polaris fleet with a force equipped with US-supplied Trident missiles. The warmth between the two principals was momentarily chilled by Reagan's initial failure to support UK in the Falklands War but this was countered by the anglophile US Defence Secretary, Caspar Weinberger, who provided strong support in terms of intelligence and munitions.

The election of PM Tony Blair in 1997 brought an opportunity to revive what President Clinton called the ‘unique partnership’. At his first meeting with his new partner, the President said: "Over the last fifty years our unbreakable alliance has helped to bring unparalleled peace and prosperity and security. It's an alliance based on shared values and common aspirations."

Co-operation with the US still had the potential to embarrass Blair, as he strove to balance it with his own leadership role in the EU. Enforcement of Iraqi no-fly zones and US bombing raids on Iraq dismayed EU partners. However, as the leading international proponent of humanitarian intervention, the hawkish Blair bullied Clinton to back diplomacy with force in Kosovo in 1999, pushing for deployment of ground troops to persuade the president "to do whatever was necessary" to win.

The personal diplomacy by Blair and George W. Bush further served to highlight the special relationship. Despite their political differences on non-strategic matters, their shared beliefs and responses to international crises led to a common purpose, especially following the 9/11 attacks. Blair was convinced of the importance of moving against the perceived threat to world peace, pledging to stand ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with Bush.

Although PM Gordon Brown stated his support for the United States on assuming office in 2007, he appointed ministers to the Foreign Office who had been critical of both aspects of the relationship and recent US policy. On meeting with Brown in March 2009, President Obama reaffirmed that 'Great Britain is one of our closest and strongest allies and there is a link and bond there that will not break.’ However, commentators unfairly noted the recurring use of 'special partnership' by White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs , supposedly signalling an effort to recast the relationship as less than close.

When David Cameron became PM, President Obama was the first foreign leader to offer his congratulations. Following the conversation, Obama said: 'As I told the prime minister, the United States has no closer friend and ally than the United Kingdom and I reiterated my deep and personal commitment to the special relationship between our two countries.' How, therefore, does this square with the Obama threat that a Brexit vote would put UK at the back of the line for a trade deal?

And now, PM Teresa May is the first head of state to meet with President Trump. Our media has quoted incessantly Mrs. May’s comment of “opposites attract.” The British media has her US trip front and centre and seeks to convince readers and consumers of the importance of this meeting. In contrast, the American media seems far more taken by their President’s many executive orders, while often failing to comment on the likely reaction of Congress and the Supreme Court to them. Too much spin, not enough substance or proper analysis. Are comments on ‘body language’ helpful?

I read nothing in today’s Washington Post or Huffington Post about Mrs. May’s visit, although it has been covered in The New York Times. What special terms could Mrs May negotiate? At the habitual joint press conference, she announced Trump’s support of NATO, subject to her persuading her European partners to contribute their fair share. Interestingly, Trump remained silent on the point.

The Westminster spin doctors will be at their trade soon enough, persuading us Brits of the major inroads in negotiations and a warm personal relationship. However, history seems to show that the real outcomes of these meetings usually produces no lasting success. The rush to show the public that the leaders are active is the spin – the sacrifice is poor planning. Will Mrs May regret rushing to cross the Atlantic to endorse this volatile President?

In the case of Trump/May, there is not really a ‘shared interest’ on all policy aspects. The British are free traders and will not welcome American isolationism and tariff introduction. Further, should Mrs May condone the principle of torture in exchange for a trade deal, the British voters would probably disown her. There is no sign that she would condone such illegality.

I believe a strong special relationship exists between Brits and Americans, not at the top levels of government but at the grass roots of our societies. I am delighted to say I have a great many American relations through my wife’s family, as well as friends of many years’ standing. My experience has been a great liking of each other’s countries, cultures and ways of life, as well as a shared language, of sorts. (Don’t get me started on “lifts/elevators.”)  There is also a warmth of feeling, not usually associated with other nationalities. I’m not sure President Trump understands this or cares.